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Underreported Earnings and Old-Age Pension: An 
Elementary  Model 
András Simonovits 
Abstract  
This paper analyzes the interconnections of underreported earnings, savings and old-
age pension with the help of a most simple, elementary model. The workers can be 
divided into three groups: 1) well-paid who report their full earnings, 2) well-paid 
who report only the minimum earnings (evaders) and 3) the poorly paid. We assume 
that the evaders save a significant part of their hidden earnings for their old age. We 
compare three pension systems of equal size: (i) the proportional, (ii) the 
proportional plus basic pension and (iii) the proportional with means testing. Our 
major result is as follows: if the evaders can be recognized and excluded, then the 
means-tested system is superior to the basic system.  
JEL: H55, D91 
Keywords:  reporting earnings, proportional pensions, basic pensions, means-
assisted pensions. 
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Keresetbevallás és öregségi nyugdíj: egy elemi modell 
Simonovits András 
Összefoglaló 
Ez a cikk a keresetbevallás, a megtakarítás és az öregségi nyugdíj kapcsolatát elemzi 
egy elemi modell segítségével. A dolgozók három osztályba sorolhatók: 1) a jól 
keresők, akik minden keresetüket bevallják, 2) a jól keresők, akik csak a minimális 
bért vallják be, 3) a minimálbért keresők. Feltesszük, hogy a járulékkerülők eltitkolt 
keresetük jelentős részét megtakarítják öregkorukra. Három azonos méretű 
nyugdíjrendszert hasonlítunk össze: (i) a bevallásarányost, (ii) az alapnyugdíjjal 
kiegészített bevallásarányost és (iii) a rászorultságival kiegészített bevallásarányost. 
Fő eredményünk: ha a járulékkerülők felismerhetők, és kizárhatók, akkor a 
rászorultsági nyugdíj előnyösebb, mint az alapnyugdíj. 
JEL: H55, D91 
Tárgyszavak:  keresetbevallás, keresetarányos nyugdíjak, alapnyugdíjak, 
rászorultsági nyugdíjak 
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There exist two pure forms of mandatory public old-age pension systems: the pension
proportional to lifetime earnings (or contribution) and the basic bene¯t, paying a univer-
sal °at bene¯t. The proportional pension system transforms the workers' forced savings
into pensions, proportionally to their lifetime earnings, while the °at bene¯t, paid in-
dependently of past earnings, dampens old-age poverty. The German and the Swedish
systems are examples for the former, while the Czech and the Irish systems represent the
latter. Of course, there exist a lot of combinations between these two extrema (see Dis-
ney, 2004). For example, the present Hungarian system|with simpli¯cations|consists
of a proportional system and of a basic system (Augusztinovics and Martos, 1996),
which has been becoming more and more proportional since the reform of 1997/1998.
The British system represents another type of combination, providing a °at bene¯t for
everybody, and additional pensions are taken into account in means-testing.
An interesting debate has recently started in Hungary whether the phasing-out of the
implicit °at component since 1998 was not an error which needs a quick correction. More
precisely, the original system strongly favored workers with short lengths of employment
and low earnings, and the future pension should be explicitly a sum of a °at and a
proportional component. In this paper I try to debate this viewpoint and propose a
much more modest and cheaper solution, namely means-testing, topping up only the
low pensions due to genuine low earnings.
How do the proponents of the combined basic system argue? In her pioneering study,
M¶ aria Augusztinovics (2005) has shown that a large part of the cohorts retiring in the
next decades will have quite low pensions. (For a newer treatment, see Augusztinovics
and KÄ oll} o, 2008.) To avoid mass poverty, she proposed a signi¯cant scaling down of
the present proportional bene¯ts and contribution rate and introducing a universal °at
bene¯t, to be ¯nanced from new taxes. An additional advantage of such a system is
that however small contribution during however short period can be added to the °at
base.
Barab¶ as (2006) and Barab¶ as et al. (2006) have a totally di®erent starting point.
According to Barab¶ as, almost half the Hungarian contributors, 1.9 out of 4.3 million
tax payers returned personal income tax ¯les about or below the legal minimum wage in
2004. An additional problem arises that on average, the foregoing workers report only
about 62 percent of the very minimum. According to Barab¶ as et al., the Hungarian
workers have already renounced the intergenerational pension contract, and the only
solution is to withdraw to a universal °at system, phasing out entirely the proportional
system, and reducing the pension burden. In the long run, everybody can do whatever
he can and wants with his earnings above the modest minimum.
1First, let us note that Barab¶ as obviously exaggerates, because he calculates with 4.3
rather than 3.9 million contributors. His data evidently contains persons working on
occasional work, mothers on maternity leaves etc. It is di±cult to accept that these
so-called minimum wage earners only reported about 62 percent of the legal minimum.
It is another issue that 90 percent of the mass of 1 million so-called entrepreneurs only
report a minimum wage. In a new work, KÄ oll} o (2008) has estimated a much lower share
of underreported earnings than Barab¶ as did. For a comparative analysis of the hidden
economy of transitional countries, see also Lack¶ o (2000). Anyway, that phenomenon
induced the recent government decision that unless one can prove that he earns little,
every entrepreneur should pay the double of the contribution due to the minimum
wage! It should be also noted that reporting a minimum wage leads to a very low
old-age pension in the proportional system.
It can be presumed that a large part of the workers reporting minimum or below
minimum wage have really low earning; however, the other part earn well but making
use of the possibilities, they only report the minimal part. These evaders underestimate
the use of old-age pension, and only save a part of the hidden earnings for their old-age,
and presume that the government will bail them out. Therefore they are not worried
by evading contributions.
Other experts, including the present author, are afraid that the introduction of a
signi¯cant universal °at bene¯t would impose a huge and unnecessary burden on the
government budget and seriously weaken the incentives to contribute. For example, if
only half of the underreporting 1 million workers have decent earnings, and save in a
hardly acceptable way for their old-age, then providing them with a °at bene¯t of 40
thousands HUFs per month (all nominal values refer to 2004) would cost super°uously
40 thousand HUFs £ 12 £ 0:5 million = 240 billion HUFs to the budget, about 10
percent of the total pension expenditure. On the other hand, the average monthly
pension of 80 thousand HUFs might be diminished by 10{20 thousands HUFs during
such a reform. In an unpublished study, Menyh¶ ert (2006) has already analyzed the
issue in detail, and also preferred a means-tested system to a universal °at one. (An
additional di±culty would arise at the introduction of universal °at bene¯ts: it would
require the proportional reduction of contributions to the mandatory funded pillar.)
We encounter a problem which is prevalent not only in Hungary, not even only in
post-communist countries but in other parts of the world as well. For example, only
about half of the workers participate regularly in the much publicized Chilean manda-
tory funded pension system, because the bulk of the self-employed cannot \a®ord" it.
In the other Latin-American countries, the participation is even lower (Gill et al., 2005).
In the present paper we try to model these issues. In our elementary model, we
shall distinguish two or three types of workers: the low-paid (L) and the well-paid (not
denoted). Within the well-paid, we further distinguish the type who reports all his
earnings (H) and the type who only reports a minimal earning (M), the evader or free-
rider. (P. Mih¶ alyi noted that a fourth group can also be studied: people earning the
minimal wage but reporting nothing.) We make a key assumption: the system is able
to separate the underreporter and the poorly paid. We are aware that many experts
oppose means-testing, because it is humiliating and costly. But here the size of bene¯t
expenditure is not as small as in the case of the much-publicized free text-books, given
to families having at least three dependent children. No, here we are speaking about
2bene¯ts amounting to 1{2 percents of the GDP, and the government has a good reason
to do something. It is noteworthy that it took a long period when at least the present
government decided to check if health-care card holders paid their contributions last
month. Until now cards obtained 15 years ago were accepted without any problem, and
probably a signi¯cant part of the workers avoid paying any health (and consequently
pension) contribution.
We mention here three results: 1) In our model, where the evaders can be excluded,
the means-tested system is superior to the basic system. 2) If the government cannot
exclude the evader, then the generous means-tested system is perhaps even socially
inferior to the basic one, since it directly rewards the free-rider. 3) The di®erence
between the consumption vectors of the two systems is small if the free-rider determines
his saving from his hidden earnings so as to make his old-age consumption independent
of the pension system chosen by the government.
The issue of universal versus means-tested pension was already discussed by Fried-
mann and Cohen (1972): they suggested the replacement of the former by the latter,
thus reducing the size of the welfare program. Modeling this choice, Feldstein (1987)
introduced individual utility functions and social welfare function and proved a major
result for a small but no negligible set of parameters: a means-tested pension can be
socially inferior to a universal one, because (i) the former \may induce some utility-
maximizing workers to save nothing" or (ii) to avoid (i), the means-tested bene¯t is set
lower than socially optimal. Note that Feldstein has not considered the central issue of
our problem: underreporting and earnings heterogeneity.
It is di±cult to resist to the temptation of summarizing the evidence of the British
pension system. Indeed, our questions have already been discussed in the context of
the ongoing British reforms: the universal °at bene¯t has been topped-up since 1997
(means-testing) and it was relaxed by the introduction of a pension credit in 2003 (Clark
and Emmerson, 2003 and Sefton et al., 2008). In more detail: the British state pension
system provides practically a universal °at bene¯t to everybody, the purchasing power
of which is constant since 1980. Its value was cc. 75 pounds in 2003 for a single person
per week. Due to budgetary pressure, the Labour Party retained rather than raised the
value of this quite modest amount, but topped it up by a means-tested bene¯t, with a
limit cc. 25 pounds in 1997. If somebody had no additional pension income, or it was
less than 25 pounds, then his basic pension and his other old-age income was lifted to
100 pounds per week.
Evidently, this system has not made the poorer workers interested in building up
additional old-age entitlements. To weaken this con°ict, in 2003 the British government
introduced a pension credit, which took into account only 40 percent of the additional
old-age income, up to 64 pounds. If somebody had a higher additional bene¯t than 64
pounds, then he did not receive anything. But if his additional income was lower than
64, say 30 pounds, then only 40 percent of 30 pounds, i.e. 12 pounds were deducted,
i.e. he obtained 25 ¡ 12 = 13 pounds.
In a very sophisticated model, Sefton at al. demonstrated that the introduction of
the pension credit raises the poor's savings but reduces the savings of the richer, hardly
improving the overall situation.
Returning to our problem, note that for the time being, we have not assumed either
individual or social optimization and neglected the choice between fully reporting or
3underreporting. nevertheless, in a work-in-progress, I have found promising results
with the use of so-called mechanism design (Mirrlees, 1971 and Diamond, 2003).
We shall outline the structure of the present paper. In Section 2 we shall discuss
the model of the proportional system. Sections 2 and 3 analyze the models of the basic
and the means-tested systems added to a proportional system, respectively. Section 5
displays numerical examples, while Section 6 concludes.
2. Proportional pensions
In our model, we make the following extreme, but still reasonable assumptions. The
population is stationary, every young works, and every old retires. The workers work
for R years, and the pensioners spend S years in retirement. Therefore the dependency
ratio is ¹ = S=R. Though the actual systems generally make an economically unsound
distinction between employer and employee's contribution rate, we do not use this dis-
tinction. Economically the relevant wage category is the total wage cost, abbreviated
here as total wage, notation: w. Everybody contributes ¿ part of his reported total wage
into a pension account. (Beware: total refers to the category rather than the share of
reported income to the true one.) There is no personal income tax, the health care
contribution is outside of the model. We assume that the ratio of the reported to the
true earning is independent of the pension system. For a while we ¯x the saving ratio
of the evader, but later on we shall discuss its dependence on the chosen system. The
pension system is in balance: its revenue (containing additional consumption tax) is
equal to its expenditures.
In this model, we shall distinguish two or three types of workers: the poorly paid
(L) and the well-paid (not denoted). Within the well-paid, we distinguish two subtypes:
those reporting full earnings (H) and those who only report the minimal earnings (M).
The frequency of the three types in the population is fH, fM and fL, respectively
generally positive numbers, exceptionally one of them can be zero. Their sum is 1:
fH + fM + fL = 1. Considering the employment as unity, the number of workers is
equal to 1.
Approximating the present Hungarian system, at least what concerns the recent
entry pensions, we assume that in the ¯rst model the pensioners receive bene¯ts pro-
portional to their reported earnings, notation: star. Let the contribution rate be ¿¤.




L, respectively. Bene¯ts are proportional to reported earnings: b¤
H = ¯¤wH and
b¤
M = b¤
L = ¯¤wL, where ¯¤ denotes the replacement rate of the proportional system.
If there were no actual and ¯ctitious partial employment, then wL would be the legal
minimum wage, and its size would in°uence the level of formal employment. These
important complexities will be neglected in the paper (see Kertesi and KÄ oll} o, 2003 and
Tonin, 2005). We shall also need the aggregate reported and actual earnings, respec-
tively:
WL = fHwH + (fM + fL)wL and WH = (fH + fM)wH + fLwL:
Since the system is balanced, we have ¿¤WL = ¹¯¤WL. Therefore the following relation
holds between the contribution rate ¿¤ and the replacement rate ¯¤: ¿¤ = ¹¯¤.
4We can assume that those reporting their full earnings do not save for their old
age, because their replacement rates are su±ciently high. In contrast, the evaders are
assumed to save for their old age, proportionally from their hidden earnings, even if
less than what the Social Security would force on them. Let 0 < ¾ < ¿¤ be the saving
ratio and let the annual saving be ¾(wH ¡ wL). Simplifying the complex relationship
between savings and dissaving, assume that the hidden saving during R working years
allows for dissaving ½(wH¡wL) during S retirement years. The e±ciency ratio ½R=(¾S)
can be less than or equal to or higher than 1. Young-age consumptions are equal to
c¤
H = (1¡¿¤)wH, c¤
M = (1¡¿¤)wL +(1¡¾)(wH ¡wL), c¤
L = (1¡¿¤)wL, respectively.




L + ½(wH ¡ wL) and d¤
L = b¤
L,
respectively. The actual or reported low earning provides only low pension and moderate
old-age consumption in the proportional system.
3. Introduction of a basic pension
As we have already mentioned in the Introduction, several experts (Augusztinovics,
2005; Barab¶ as, 2006) see the way out of the emerging pension tensions in the scaling-
down of the proportional system and a simultaneous introduction of a basic pension
(notation: hat). In this Section we shall model such a reform. Let the basic °at bene¯t
b0 be given, and ¯nanced from a consumption tax with rate ^ ¶. Of course, everybody
pays this proportional tax after spending money for consumption and for mathematically
simplicity, we shall assume that the basic bene¯t is given in net term. The gross pensions
are as follows:
^ bH = ^ ¯wH +
b0
1 ¡ ^ ¶
and ^ bM = ^ bL = ^ ¯wL +
b0
1 ¡ ^ ¶
:
In contrast with the pension contribution, it is assumed that it is impossible to avoid
paying consumption tax. There is no aggregate saving in this model, therefore the
aggregate consumption is equal to the aggregate output, i.e. the aggregate earnings.
Since ¹ pensioners correspond to 1 worker, the tax equation is as follows:
¹b0 = ^ ¶WH;
whence the tax rate can be directly computed. The down-scaled contribution ^ ¿w only
¯nances the reduced labor pension ^ ¯w: ^ ¿WL = ¹^ ¯WL, i.e. ^ ¿ = ¹^ ¯.
For the sake of comparability, we assume that the aggregate pension expenditure is
invariant:
^ ¿WL + ^ ¶WH = ¿¤WL:
Substituting ^ ¶ from the old equation into the new one yields
^ ¿WL + ¹b0 = ¿¤WL:
Hence the reduced contribution rate can be determined:




5To obtain a nonnegative contribution, one must assume ¹b0 · ¿¤WL, i.e. b0 · ¿¤WL=¹.
The young-age consumptions are respectively equal to
^ cH = (1¡^ ¶)(1¡^ ¿)wH; ^ cM = (1¡^ ¶)[(1¡^ ¿)wL+(1¡¾)(wH¡wl)]; ^ cL = (1¡^ ¶)(1¡^ ¿)wL:
The old-age consumptions are respectively equal to
^ dH = (1 ¡ ^ ¶)^ bH; ^ dM = (1 ¡ ^ ¶)[^ bL + ½(wH ¡ wL)]; ^ dL = (1 ¡ ^ ¶)^ bL:
The bene¯t and the consumption of workers with low reported income (regardless of
under- or fully reported) are sharply raised with respect to the proportional system,
those of the type H are reduced.
4. The introduction of means-tested pension
Recapitulating the relevant parts of the Introduction, we can list several objections to
the introduction of basic bene¯ts: a) the fully reporting well-paid workers (H) receive
much lower bene¯t than they would obtain in the proportional system; b) the underre-
porting well-paid workers (M) gain more than they lose, though they do not deserve the
bonus. As a rule, in the present paper we shall consider a particularly favorable case
for the means-tested pension (denoted by bar): the government is able to distinguish
the needy (L) from the evader (M), and is able to introduce a targeted bene¯t. (At
the same time, our model considers the distribution of underreporters as given, thus it
favors the basic system.) We speak of means-tested bene¯t if only the L-type receives
additional bene¯t, i.e. M- and H-types do not. (In the simulation, however, we make
a short detour and in the last rows of Tables 1 and 2, we analyze the generous means-
testing, where in addition to L, also M receives additional pension. Notation: o). There
exist now three types of bene¯ts: ¹ bH = ¹ ¯wH, ¹ bM = ¹ ¯wL and ¹ bL = ^ bL, where of course,
^ bL > ¹ ¯wL. We must calculate again the contribution and the tax rates. For simplicity,
we neglected the di®erence between the net and gross bene¯ts, its quantitative impact
is negligible.
Now only the additional bene¯t of the needy is ¯nanced from taxes:
¹fL(^ bL ¡ ¹ ¯wL) = ¹ ¶WH:
The contribution ¹ ¿w ¯nances the proportional component ¹ ¯w: ¹ ¿ = ¹¹ ¯. Inserting into
the equation for invariant pension expenditure
¹ ¿WL + ¹ ¶WH = ¿¤WL;
yields
¹ ¿WL + ¹fL^ bL ¡ fL¹ ¿wL = ¿¤WL:
After arrangement, the contribution rate of the means-tested system is
¹ ¿ =
¿¤WL ¡ fL¹^ bL
WL ¡ fLwL
:
To have a nonnegative contribution rate, we must assume ¿¤WL ¸ fL¹^ bL. The formulas
for young- and old-aged consumption are easily obtained. By excluding the free riders,
the means-tested system only di®ers from the proportional one at a single point: it
raises the pensions of the needy, while reduces the bene¯ts of the well paid, regardless
whether they report full or partial earnings.
65. Numerical examples
Since even our very simple model does not yield clear-cut results, it is worth of presenting
numerical simulations. Since we have a very rude model, it is su±cient to use simple
numbers. Length of employment: R = 40 years, time spent in retirement: S = 20 years,
i.e. the dependency ratio: ¹ = 0:5. Earning distribution: wH = 4, wL = 1. Note that
the average reported wage is WL = 2:8, which is largely consistent with the Hungarian
data (again at 2004 prices): 2:8 £ 70;000 HUF = 196;000 HUF. Contribution rate
with respect to total wage: ¿¤ = 0:2. (The traditional rate with respect to gross wage,
assuming a rational, equalized employee and employer's rate, results in 0:2=0:9 = 22:2









We shall assume that the basic bene¯t is equal to the half of the average proportional
pension: b0 = ¿WL=(2¹). A further assumption is: the contribution evader saves
half the money what the Social Security would save for him from his hidden earnings:
¾ = ¿=2. By assumption, this rate is independent of the chosen pension system. We
shall, however, relax this assumption at the end of the simulation.
First of all, we display the crucial parameters of the various runs in a table.
Table 0. Runs and parameters
Type H Type M Type L Saving
s h a r e rate
Parameter fH fM fL ¾
Base run 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.1
Full reporting 0.8 0 0.2 0.1
Every low earner evader 0.6 0.4 0 0.1
Endogenous saving rate 0.6 0.2 0.2 x
Base run
Let us start from the following distribution of types: fH = 0:6; fM = 0:2 and fL = 0:2.
First we shall present the parameters (Table 1) and the bene¯ts of the evader in the
three pension systems, then we turn to the consumption vectors (Table 2). The meaning
of the last row will be explained later on.
7Table 1. Parameters of three pension systems (base run)
Contribution Tax The evader's
Type rate rate bene¯t
¿ ¶ bM
Proportional 0.200 0.000 0.400
Plus basic bene¯t 0.100 0.082 0.810
Plus means-tested bene¯t 0.184 0.013 0.368
Plus means-tested bene¯t o 0.166 0.028 0.810
Rather arbitrarily we choose the parameters of the basic model so that in the system
with basic bene¯t, on average, the proportional and the constant components be equal
to each other. (By and large, this is true for the Swiss system.) Then the contribution
rate is halved with respect to the proportional system, but a consumption tax with
a rate 8.2 percent emerges. This system doubles the bene¯ts of those reporting low
earnings but does not make any distinction between full reports (L) and underreports
(M).
This issue is solved by the introduction of a means-tested component: here the
contribution rate signi¯cantly rises with respect to the basic system and the tax rate
almost disappears: drops to 1.3 percent.
We now turn to the description of the consumption vectors, leaving aside the last
row.
Table 2. Characteristics of the three pension systems (base run, wL = 1)
Young-age consumption Old-age consumption
Type H M L H M L
cH cM cL dH dM dL
Proportional 3.200 3.500 0.800 1.600 1.000 0.400
Plus basic bene¯t 3.304 3.304 0.826 1.294 1.294 0.744
Plus means-tested bene¯t 3.221 3.470 0.805 1.455 0.956 0.800
Plus means-tested bene¯t o 3.243 3.435 0.811 1.289 1.371 0.787
Of course, the bene¯ts of H- and L-types|-apart from taxes|are equal to their
old-age consumptions. In turn, the M-type saves half his earnings for his old-age, with
the same e±ciency as that of the Social Security. Although the insu±cient saving rate
of M reduces the replacement rate from 0.5 to 0.29, there is no reason to be afraid of
M's starvation: his consumption is still 2.5 times of L's. It is striking that in the basic
system, the consumptions of H and M coincide in both age-groups: ^ cH = ^ cM, ^ dH = ^ dM.
The reason is simple: by chance, the saving rate is equal to the reduced contribution
rate: ¾ = ^ ¿. If the saving rate changes or the e±ciency of saving di®ers from the Social
Security's, then this coincidence disappears. The means-tested system is superior to
that of the basic one, because the former supports the needy's old-age consumption but
not the evader's.
Since the calculation in terms of minimum wage may be di±cult, we shall display
the results of the base run in terms of the actual average earnings (Table 2).
8Table 2.a. The characteristics of the base run in terms of WH
Young-age consumption Old-age consumption
Type H M L H M L
cH cM cL dH dM dL
Proportional 0.941 1.029 0.235 0.471 0.294 0.118
Plus basic bene¯t 0.972 0.972 0.243 0.381 0.381 0.219
Plus means-tested bene¯t 0.947 1.021 0.237 0.428 0.281 0.235
The following question naturally arises: what happens if the government cannot or
does not want to exclude the evaders from the means-tested system? According to the
marked rows (o) of Tables 1 and 2, the contribution rate is somehow reduced, the tax
rate is more than doubled. The vector of young-age consumption hardly changes, but
the old-age consumption of H drops from 1.45 to 1.29 units, while that of the free rider
rises from 0.86 to 1.37 units, overtaking that of H. What a pity! Still, the needy's bene¯t
hardy diminishes, i.e. it stays much above that in the basic system. In summary: In
this case, the generous means-tested system is neither superior nor inferior to the basic
system.
After this detour, we return to the sensitivity investigations: how strongly do our
results depend on some parameters of our model? For example, what happens if every-
body fully reports his earning, or just the opposite, there is no low-paid? Or what
saving rule, i.e. saving ratio ensures the same old-age consumption for the evaders in
all the three systems? Finally, what happens if the evaders do not save at all? For the
sake of transparency, we keep presenting our results in two twin tables, but we skip the
analysis of the generous means-tested system.
No evaders
We start our sensitivity analysis with the ideal case when there are no evaders: fH = 0:8
and fM = 0. We also keep the contribution rate ¿ = 0:2 as in the proportional system,
although there is another alternative: to ¯x the value of the total pensions. Table 3
contains the new parameters and Table 4 displyas the results.
Table 3. Parameters of three pension systems (no evader)
Type Contribution rate Tax rate
¿ ¶
Proportional 0.200 0.000
Plus basic 0.100 0.100
Or means-tested 0.165 0.035
Since the evaders disappeared, in the basic system the tax rate rose from 8.2 to 10
percent, but in the means-tested system from 1.3 to 3.5 percent, while the contribution
rate diminished from 18.4 to 16.5 percent.
9Table 4. Characteristics of three pension systems (no evader)
Young-age consumption Old age consumption
Type H M L H M L
cH cM cL dH dM dL
Proportional 3.200 { 0.800 1.600 { 0.400
Plus basic pension 3.240 { 0.810 1.280 { 0.740
Or means-tested 3.223 { 0.806 1.272 { 0.793
The modi¯cation of the consumption landscape is more complex. The proportional
system is unchanged but in the °at system the well-paid's young-age consumption rises,
its old-age counterpart remains unchanged, the low-paid's consumption pair remain
more balanced. The advantage of the means-tested system over the °at one is signif-
icantly reduced, practically disappears, only the low-paid's old-age consumption rises
somewhat.
Every \low-paid" is evader
We examine now the other extremum, namely when all the \low-paid" workers are
evaders: fM = 0:4, fL = 0. (If the reader is worried that in this case, there is no
asymmetric information, he can modify the set-up by allowing a tiny mass of L-types.)
Then the means-tested system is by de¯nition reduced to the proportional one (since
there is no needy), therefore we drop this system. Table 5 presents the new parameters,
while Table 6 displays the results.
Table 5. Parameters of three pension systems (all evaders)
Type Contribution rate Tax rate Evader's bene¯t
¿ ¶ bM
Proportional 0.2 0.000 0.400
Plus basic pension 0.1 0.070 0.802
There is only one interesting change with respect to the base run: the tax rate
decreases from 8.2 to 7 percent.
Table 6. Characteristics of the three pension systems (no evaders)
Young-age consumption Old-age consumption
Type H M L H M L
cH cM cL dH dM dL
Proportional 3.200 3.500 { 1.600 1.000 {
Plus basic pension 3.348 3.348 { 1.304 1.304 {
We only discuss the change in the basic pension system: the H-type's consumption
increases with respect to the base run. At the same time, the pitfalls of the basic pension
becomes evident: the evaders exploit the full contributors.
10Endogenous saving rate
Until now we have considered the saving rate as given. Now we drop this assumption
and discuss the situation when the evaders choose their saving rates so as to make the
old-age consumption independent of the pension system. With trial and error, we ¯nd
that in a basic pension system the free rider's saving rate drops to 4.7 percent (from 10
percent of the proportional system), while in the means-tested system, it rises to 10.7
percent. Since this modi¯cation has no impact on the other parameters and variables,
we unify the usual two tables into a shortened Table 7.
Table 7. Evader's characteristics (endogenous saving)
Saving Evader's consumption
Type rate young-age old-age
¾ cM dM
Proportional 0.100 3.500 1.000
Plus basic pension 0.047 3.449 1.002
Or means-tested pension 0.107 3.449 0.997
It is noteworthy that under endogenous savings, the di®erence between the young-
age consumption vectors of the basic and the means-tested systems is minimal and
M's young-age consumption is only 0.05 units lower than the proportional system's.
With respect to the base run, however, the change is signi¯cant: in the basic system,
M's young-age consumption modestly grows (from 3.3 to 3.45 units), but his old-age
consumption signi¯cantly drops (from 1.29 to 1.0 unit). In the means-tested system,
the change is even sharper: though the young-age consumption is essentially unchanged,
the old-age consumption drops even more (from 1.37 to 1.0).
No voluntary saving
The following question can be asked: what happens if the evaders do not save anything
at all: ¾ = 0? Similarly to the previous runs, it can be shown that the young-age
consumption increases by 0.3 units, while its counterpart drops by 0.6 units { with
respect to the base run. Then the government must help even the free rider, therefore
the basic system is not that bad.
6. Conclusions
We have completed the analysis of our elementary model. We have proved that in
our custom-made basic model, where the free riders can be excluded from the means-
tested system but they save for themselves, regardless of the chosen pension system,
the government should introduce a means-tested rather than a basic system. If the
evaders cannot be excluded, then the ranking is not unequivocal. Finally, if the free
rider's saving depends on the system, then the consumption di®erences between the two
systems may even disappear.
11We have neglected the issue of self-selection of the contribution evaders. Never-
theless, we have good reasons to assume that the lower the share of the proportional
component in the total pension, the higher is the share of the evaders among the well-
paid workers. The clari¯cation of this issue is under way in another paper, where I
apply the method of mechanism design (Mirrlees, 1971 and Diamond, 2003).
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